Bounded Rationality in Scholarly Knowledge Discovery by Lerman, Kristina et al.
Bounded Rationality in Scholarly Knowledge Discovery
Kristina Lerman1∗ and Nathan Hodas2 and Hao Wu1
1 USC Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA
2 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, USA
Email: Kristina Lerman∗- lerman@isi.edu; Nathan Hodas -nathanhodas@pnnl.gov; Hao Wu -hwu@usc.edu;
∗Corresponding author
Abstract
In an information-rich world, people’s time and attention must be divided among rapidly changing information
sources and the diverse tasks demanded of them. How people decide which of the many sources, such as scientific
articles or patents, to read and use in their own work affects dissemination of scholarly knowledge and adoption of
innovation. We analyze the choices people make about what information to propagate on the citation networks of
Physical Review journals, US patents and legal opinions. We observe regularities in behavior consistent with human
bounded rationality: rather than evaluate all available choices, people rely on simply cognitive heuristics to decide
what information to attend to. We demonstrate that these heuristics bias choices, so that people preferentially
propagate information that is easier to discover, often because it is newer or more popular. However, we do
not find evidence that popular sources help to amplify the spread of information beyond making it more salient.
Our paper provides novel evidence of the critical role that bounded rationality plays in the decisions to allocate
attention in social communication.
1 Introduction
Scholarly knowledge is expressed through published works—scientific papers, books, patents, and legal
opinions—which are linked together through citations. Citations analysis has emerged as a method to
identify important scientific works [9, 39] and trends [7, 30, 40], measure the productivity of individual sci-
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entists [?, 19], quantify economic value of innovations [?,?], and identify important court decisions [14, 33].
Citations analysis is at the core of new proposals for allocating federal research budget [6].
Researchers, however, have questioned the objectivity of citations as a measure of importance of a
scholarly work. Evidence suggests that citations may be biased by social influence [41], coverage in the
popular press [36], and even the position on a web page the paper appears [18]. The present work extends
this line of inquiry to examine the cognitive and attentional factors that play a role in the citing behavior. Our
central tenet is that knowledge discovery in citation networks is a human activity, and as such, constrained
by the available time, motivation, and cognitive resources people are willing to invest in finding, processing,
and evaluating information. This phenomenon, referred to as bounded rationality by economists [23, 42],
profoundly affects the decisions people make. Because people cannot attend to all information, they employ
a variety cognitive heuristics to quickly (and often unconsciously) decide what information to pay attention
to [24]. These heuristics introduce predictable biases into decision-making processes shaping human behavior,
including how people discover scholarly works. Social influence, also known as the “bandwagon effect”, is one
such cognitive heuristic: people pay attention to the choices of other people. Another important cognitive
heuristic is “position bias” [35]: people pay more attention to items at the top of the list than those below
them. This bias explains why information fails to spread widely in social media [28] and may be the reason
why articles in top positions in the daily digest of papers submitted to arXiv preprint server receive more
citations [12,18].
We investigate how bounded rationality affects citations patterns by conducting a comparative analysis
of citations made by physics articles, U.S. patents and federal court decisions. The domains we study vary
in the type of information citations communicate, the motivations of participants to cite, the effort they are
willing to expend in knowledge discovery, and the conventions established in citing. Beyond this, they are
similar in how people discover and evaluate knowledge. We describe an empirical approach that disentangles
multiple factors contributing to the strategies people use to discover and link to existing information. The
key to our approach is to split the data into more homogeneous populations and to carry out ‘human response
dynamics’-based analysis within each population [20].
Our study identifies common patterns in citing behavior. (1) We find that people pay more attention to
works that are easier to find, for example, because they are cited by popular works. For scientific papers,
this may cause some papers to receive more citations than higher quality papers that are more difficult
to find. (2) We find that attention to scholarly works decays over time in all domains: people pay more
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attention to more recent information [44]. (3) Also, other factors being equal, people pay more attention to
popular works, where popularity is measured by the number of citations. On the other hand, (4) we found
no evidence for another type of social influence: being cited by a popular work does not attract preferentially
more attention to the cited work. This is contrary to the halo effect in psychology, in which a person’s ability
in one area colors the perceptions of others of his or her abilities in other areas.
In order to understand and model knowledge discovery in citations networks, we must account for bounded
rationality. While our study does not replace controlled experiments, our analysis of existing behavioral data
can guide future experiments to explore the causal relationships proposed here.
2 Methods
2.1 Data
We conduct comparative empirical analysis of citations networks from three different domains.
Scientific papers Scientists communicate discoveries and research findings by publishing papers, in which they
situate their work within a field by citing existing papers. In our study, we used a large historic data set
provided by the American Physical Society (APS). The APS publishes prestigious physics journals, including
Physical Review Letters, the Physical Review, and Reviews of Modern Physics. The APS dataset contains
information about more than 450,000 articles published by the APS journals between the years 1893 and
2007 and the citations made by these articles to other articles in the dataset [39]. A caveat about this
dataset: it only includes citations to other papers published by the APS and not to papers published in
other journals. The documented citations represent the lower bound on the citations made by and to each
paper, and our conclusions could be easily verified on larger universes of citation data.
Patents A patent grants an innovator an exclusive use of the proposed idea for a limited period of time. Like
scientific papers, patents link to existing state-of-the-art to demonstrate the novelty of an idea or technology.
We use an historic data set of citations made by U.S. patents awarded between the years 1963 and 1999.
However, these data include citations made by patents awarded between 1975 and 1999. A caveat about this
data set is that patents are reviewed by patent examiners, who sometimes insert their own citations. We do
not distinguish between citations made by the innovator and those inserted by the patent examiner.
Legal decisions Law is the system of rules and conventions that regulate the actions of individuals in a society.
Laws make social and economic relationships predictable and consistent, yet laws evolve over time as new
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laws are created to reflect evolving social norms and are tested in courts. The outcome of a court case is a
legal decision or an opinion.The legal system has developed conventions for representing and communicating
knowledge, utilizing citations to other judicial opinions, combined with signals of agreement/disagreement,
context and specificity.
As a result, case-law, the law as determined by the courts, is encoded in the citations network. We have
used a large digitized record of federal court opinions from the CourtListener project in our study.
2.2 Data Characteristics
We represent each citations network as a directed graph in which nodes are documents, e.g., physics papers,
and edges are citations. We use a convention in which edges run from a citing document to a cited document.
Hence, outgoing edges represent citations made by a document, i.e., its bibliography, and incoming edges
represent citations of the document by other documents.
(a) papers (b) patents (c) legal opinions
Figure 1: Number of new nodes and edges in the citation network over time.
Figure 1 shows the number of new nodes created in each citation network over time and the number of
new citations made by the nodes. The dip in publication of physics papers prior to 1950 corresponds to the
period of World War II. Aside from this dip, and another smaller one during World War I, the number of
papers published by APS has grown significantly over the decades. The number of citations has increased
even faster than the number of papers, due to an increase in the average number of references to previous
works made in each paper. As in the scientific citations domain, the number of patents has also grown over
the years, with the number of citations made by patents increasing even faster. In the legal citations data,
we distinguish between decisions made by the Supreme Court of the United States (USSC) decisions and
other federal opinions. Note that the discontinuity around 1950 corresponds to an increase in availability of
digitized data and does not reflect underlying differences in the number of opinions written.
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2.3 Mutual Information
In addition to Pearson correlation, we use mutual information to study relationships between variables. It’s
advantage is that it allows us to study relationships that go beyond linearity. Mutual information I(X;Y ) is
a non-parametric estimate of the reduction in uncertainty about a variable X achieved by knowing another
variable Y . Large value of mutual information indicates there is a strong dependence between the variables,
while I(X;Y ) = 0 means that they are independent.
We use conditional mutual information to test whether another variable Z may explain the effects of
Y on X. Conditional mutual information is defined as I(X;Y |Z) = I(X;Y,Z)–I(X;Z). If Y is merely a
proxy for Z, then I(X;Y |Z) < I(X;Y ), in the extreme case, when Y is equal to Z, I(X;Y |Z) = 0. If, on
the other hand, Y and Z together better explain X than either does alone, than I(X;Y |Z) > I(X;Y ).
3 Results
We start with comparative analysis of citation patterns across all three domains. Results reveal similarities
across domains, which suggests commonalities of behaviors in citation networks.
(a) papers (b) patents (c) legal opinions
Figure 2: Distribution of the number of times (a) a scientific paper, (b) a patent and (c) legal opinion were
cited by other documents.
3.1 Citations Inequality
It has been known since the infancy of bibliometrics research that the recognition scientific papers receive,
as measured by the number of citations, is extremely unequal, with a handful of papers receiving thousands
of citations, while most of the other papers are seldom cited. In fact, almost 70% of the papers in the APS
data set were cited fewer than ten times. Figure 2(a) shows this heterogeneous distribution.
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(a) papers (b) patents (c) legal opinions
Figure 3: Average number of citations as a function of the number of references made by documents.
The distribution of patent citations (Fig. 2(b)) has a similar trend. Citations inequality is greater for
patents: 85% of the patents were cited fewer than ten times. Since citations count is thought to reflect the
patents’ economic value [?,?], this result suggests that nine out of ten patents hold little value. Figure 2(c)
shows the distribution of citations to Supreme Court opinions and those made by other courts. Compared to
scientific papers and patents, legal citations have far less inequality: only about 60% of the Supreme Court
opinions receive ten or fewer citations.
What gives rise to inequality in citations? Merton [31] argued that the process of “cumulative advantage”
in science brings greater recognition to scientists who are already distinguished, resulting in unequal recog-
nition scientists receive. Since Merton’s classic work, many researchers have speculated about the origins
“cumulative advantage” [?, ?, 37], with some attributing it to the “first mover advantage” [34] and others
suggesting that limited attention is the cause [15,25]. Similar to the latter argument, we believe that inequal-
ity is a byproduct of bounded rationality. The cognitive heuristics that affect people’s decisions to allocate
their limited attention lead to inequality, which is further exacerbated by the growth of literature [5].
3.2 Temporal Response
Temporal patterns of citations hint at the processes of information discovery in these diverse domains. We
examine the following temporal properties: document’s age at the time of first citation, at the time of any
citation, and time since its last citation.
Age at First Citation Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of the time to first citation of scientific papers
published since 1960 (Fig. 4(a)) and patents granted over a similar time period (Fig. 4(b)). Figure 4(c)
shows the age of a legal opinion at the time it is first cited. These empirical results reveal the time scales of
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(a) papers (b) patents (c) legal
Figure 4: Distribution of time to first citation of (a) scientific papers, (b) patents, and (c) U.S. Federal Court
decisions. Dashed lines are guides for the eye.
knowledge discovery in these domains. In general, the age of the document strongly decreases its chance to
be discovered de novo, even after accounting for the shrinking pool of uncited documents over time. Unlike
scientific papers, which are most likely to be cited within 8–10 months of publication, patents are most
likely to be discovered within about two years of their grant date (Fig. 4(b)). In both data sets, the peaks
correspond to the period the document is most easily discovered. Until the rise of the web, a newly published
physics paper appeared in a journal, which was easily accessible on the shelves of academic libraries. After
some period of time, typically a year, journal issues were bound into volumes and moved to less accessible
places in the library, requiring a greater effort for discovery. Citations peak corresponds to the period of
greatest accessibility of the paper (when it is on the library shelves). The two-year peak in patent citation,
on the other hand, is probably related to the time scale of patent approval. In our data set, the time
interval between a patent application and approval is sharply peaked at two years. Hence, while the patent
is most discoverable shortly after its publication (at the time it is granted), we do not see the evidence of
the discovery until two years later, when the citing patent is granted. In the legal domain, federal opinions
are also most likely to be cited within two years of their publication, probably reflecting the time scales at
which cases are decided in the courts. The Supreme Court opinions, however, do not show an optimal time
scale for discovery.
Another interesting difference between domains is in the rate of forgetting. A newly published scientific
paper is more quickly forgotten than a newly granted patent or Supreme Court opinion. Probability of first
citation to a scientific paper decreases at a rate ≈ ∆t−2.3 (dashed line in Fig. 4(a)), while a patent citation
probability decreases at a rate ≈ ∆t−1.4 (dashed line in Fig. 4(b)). The steep drop off in patent citation
after about 300 months is an artifact of the finite data size, which constrains citation period to at most 36
years. Legal opinions are forgotten less quickly than papers. As we would expect, Supreme Court opinions
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are forgotten even more slowly (as ≈ ∆t−1.4) than other federal opinions (≈ ∆t−1.8).
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Likelihood of getting cited vs paper’s age. (a) Number of citations made to papers published in
the month of January in different decades vs time. An older paper is much less likely to get cited than a
younger paper, but more more recent papers appear to get more citations overall. (b) Same data, but with
number of citations made during some month to Jan papers normalized by the total number of citations
made that month.
Citation Age Figure 5 shows how a scientific paper’s age affects the likelihood that it will be cited by any
paper, not just the first citing paper. Specifically, it shows how the total number of citations received by
papers published over a period of one month, here January of different decades, changes over time. Papers
published in more recent decades receive more citations. From this, one may conclude that more recent
papers receive more attention, e.g., papers published in 2002 get ten times as many citations after one year
as those published in 1952. However, this is simply an artifact of the increasing number of publications.
When we normalize the number of citations made during some month to the January papers by the total
number of citations made by all papers published that month, the curves line up (Fig. 5(b)). In other words,
the fraction of attention received by a paper ∆t months after its publication is the same, regardless of when
it is published. A similar normalizing trend was observed by [37] when comparing citation rates between
different scientific disciplines.
Attention (via the proxy of citations) decays rapidly in time. This decay does not indicate some sort of
rapid obsolescence of scientific research, becoming irrelevant within 12 months of publication. A more likely
explanation is that by the time a paper is one year old, it must compete for researchers’ limited attention
with a rapidly increasing number of newer publications. Later in this paper we examine the mechanisms
researchers use to allocate their attention among papers which could account for these trends.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: Temporal characteristics of the last citation, including the (a) age and (b) time since last citation of
a physics paper, a patent and US Supreme Court opinions (SC cases). The time to last citation is calculated
from the end of the data set.
Time since Last Citation How quickly is information forgotten? Figure 6(a) shows the age of the document
at the time of last citation. In all three data sets, there exist similar preferences for citing more recent
documents, with one- or two-year old documents most likely to be cited. However, the propensity to cite
older documents is very different in the three domains. While an older patent is somewhat more likely to be
cited than an older physics paper, an older Supreme Court opinion is vastly most likely to be cited.
Differences also emerge when looking at the time since last citation (Fig. 6(b)), which give the time scales
of obsolescence of information in different domains. Physics papers and patents look remarkably similar to
each other, at least over the length of the patents data set. In both APS and Supreme Court data sets, there
is a sharp drop in citation probability around 60 years. After that, it becomes increasingly less likely to find
a physics paper that has not been cited in decades, while there is a bigger constant probability to find a
Supreme Court opinion that has not been cited in decades. These trends could potentially be explained by
individual’s memory, since sixty years is roughly the span of a scientist’s or a judge’s career. We leave this
question for future research.
3.3 A Model of Knowledge Discovery in Networks
In order to cite a work, a scholar must first discover it. Before the age of the internet, information discovery
was a cumbersome process. Scientists discovered new papers outside of the citation network by browsing
copies of journals on library shelves, reading popular press, receiving reprints from colleagues, or hearing
about them at meetings. Innovators and legal scholars read official government publications to discover new
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opinions. The digital age offers many more options for information discovery. Scientists can browse free
online resources, such as the arXiv preprint server or Google Scholar. Modern search engines index the
text of documents, making them discoverable through keyword searches. However, citation networks remain
an integral part of the discovery process. As scholars discover works, they may cite them it in their own
publications. These new documents may themselves be discovered and read, providing a path for others to
discover the original work.
Figure 7: A model of knowledge discovery in citation networks, where users discover the original document
through citation links from other documents.
Figure 7 illustrates the process through which people discover and cite some document published at time
t1. We refer to this document, shown in blue in Fig. 7, as the original document. During some time period
∆tlp = t2−t1, the latency period, the original document is discovered and cited by newer documents. We call
these citing documents, shown in red, initial citations. The red documents are, in turn, discovered during
an (arbitrary) exposure period ∆texp = t3 − t2. People who find the red documents will be exposed to the
original blue document by seeing it cited in the red document. If the original document is relevant, they may
then cite it. We call the new citations of the original document infections, and they are shown in orange.
However, we do not know how these authors discovered the original document. The first infection shown in
the figure could have discovered the original document through a red document or another document citing
it. In order not to undercount such infections, we make the infection period ∆tinf = t4 − t2 overlap the
exposure period.
Initial citations (red documents) expose readers to the original document. However, each red document
may cite many other documents (striped green), which may distract readers from the original document.
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(i) papers (ii) patents (iii) opinions (iv) SC opinions
Figure 8: Exposure response. Average number of new citations (infections) documents receive for a given
number of exposures. Exposure period is a two/five year interval following the latency period.
Hence, we call these other documents distractions.
3.4 Cognitive Heuristics
The relationships between new citations (infections) and initial citations, exposures, and distractions re-
veal the processes of knowledge discovery in citation networks and the role of cognitive heuristics in these
processes.
Visibility Bias We characterize how easily a document can be discovered by its visibility. A high visibility
document takes little effort to find, because it is seemingly ‘everywhere.’ Visibility may trigger cognitive
processes associated with the availability heuristic, which may increase document’s perceived importance.
Supporting this idea, previous studies have shown that being featured in the popular press [36] or the top of
arXiv daily listings [12,18], leads to more citations for scientific papers. In this study we examine the more
generic aspect of visibility: being cited by others. Specifically, we ask whether being cited by widely read
documents leads to more citations (new infections) for the original work? Every citation chain—solid green
→ red → blue in Fig. 7—raises the visibility of the original document. Without these chains, readers must
discover the document de novo, so the chains provide a way to quantify boosted visibility relative to other
documents of the same age. We formulate our claim as follows:
Visibility bias: documents that receive more exposures will receive more citations during the
infection period.
Figure 8 shows the average number of new citations received by documents with a certain number of
exposures. Each line corresponds to a different latency period. Each curve initially grows linearly (in log
scale) but later saturates, evidence of the intuition that the more visible a document was during exposure
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Pearson coefficient linear regression coefficients
data (latency period) r(IC, I) r(EC , I) r(a ∗ IC + b ∗ EC + c, I) a b c
papers (LP=2yrs) 0.7147 0.6852 0.7410 0.4271 0.0665 0.6026
papers (LP=5yrs) 0.6819 0.7208 0.7451 0.1036 0.0574 0.1385
patents (LP=2yrs) 0.4369 0.4162 0.4821 0.5825 0.4493 0.5612
patents (LP=5yrs) 0.5109 0.5836 0.6118 0.1346 0.1530 0.3221
opinions (LP=2yrs) 0.6872 0.4894 0.6873 0.7687 -0.0048 0.1962
opinions (LP=5yrs) 0.8037 0.7014 0.8192 0.2508 0.0535 -0.1396
USSC (LP=2yrs) 0.7149 0.5515 0.7234 1.2026 -0.1231 1.7000
USSC (LP=5yrs) 0.8566 0.8137 0.8801 0.2358 0.0773 -0.0370
Table 1: Correlation of new citations, that are infections (I) with the number of exposures received. We
report results for three different models of exposure: initial citations (IC), citations during the exposure
period (EC), or a linear combination of the two, with parameters obtained via linear regression analysis. All
correlations are statistically significant (p < 0.001).
period, the more new citations it received during the infection period. However, exposures exceeding certain
level have a diminishing return in terms of new citations. One possible explanation is that the field become
saturated, when all potential citers know of the document, with no possibility of further citations growth.
We quantify the relationships between new citations (infections I) and related variables. Table 1 reports
Pearson correlation of the new citations with exposures under three different models of exposure: initial
citations (IC) during the latency period, exposures (E), and a linear combination of the two, with parameters
determined through least square error estimation of linear regression. Correlations are large and significant,
with largest correlation obtained through combination of citations during the latency period and exposure
period. These positive correlations are consistent with our hypothesis. Note that in a model of how scientific
papers accumulate new citations, Wang et al. [44] took a paper’s visibility to be the number of citations it
receives. This is a good first-order approximations, though indirect exposures through initial citations of the
original paper also contribute to paper’s visibility.
In conclusion, results of aggregate analysis suggest that, all things being equal, a document that has a
higher visibility, because it receives a greater exposure through citations, will be cited more in the future
than a lower visibility document. However, not every exposure is equally effective in attracting attention.
Below, we attempt to statistically tease out the indicators of how people allocate their attention across
different documents and account for how citation information is utilized.
Novelty Bias Recency bias is well documented in psychology, which has shown that people often pay more
attention to, and more easily recollect, recent stimuli or observations. In this section we show that people
intrinsically favor citing more recent documents, after accounting for visibility.
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Figure 9: Novelty bias. Median infection rate for all documents decreases for longer latency periods, showing
preference to cite more recent works.
Novelty bias: given equal visibility, people are more likely to cite more recent documents.
In our data, exposures following a longer latency period are less effective in generating new citations to
documents than exposures following a short latency period. To rule out systematic shifts in the populations
of documents that receive a certain number of exposures, we study the infection rate, i.e., the rate at which
exposures are converted into new citations, on a per-document basis. For each document, we measure the
number of exposures it receives during the one-year exposure period following a certain latency period1 and
the number of new citations (infections) it receives during the infection period. The infection rate for each
document for any given latency period is the number of new infections divided by the number of exposures.
Figure 9 shows the median infection rate for all documents vs the latency period.The median infection rate
decreases over time, evidence of a general novelty bias. This finding is consistent with the view that the
perceived relevance of scholarly works [43,44]— even of facts themselves [3]—evolves over time as it is refined
by successive generations of scientists.
Popularity Bias In the absence of information about the costs and benefits of various decisions, people tend
to imitate the behavior of others. This cognitive bias, referred to the “bandwagon effect” or “social proof,”
plays a fundamental role in explaining human behavior in psychology, sociology and economics, and is one
of the mechanisms for social influence [4]. In citations, this bias could manifest itself in a number of ways.
Scholars may be more likely to read documents that were cited more frequently. A ranking in Google scholar
search results or an endorsement by a digest are some of the signals of a document’s popularity.
1We add 1 to all exposures to avoid division by 0.
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(i) papers (LP=2yrs) (ii) patents (LP=2yrs) (iii) cases (LP=2yrs) (iv) SC cases (LP=2yrs)
data (latency period) MI(EC , I) CMI(EC , I|IC) II(EC, I, IC)
papers (LP=2yrs) 0.4362 0.1991 -0.2371
papers (LP=5yrs) 0.4522 0.2772 -0.1751
patents (LP=2yrs) 0.0812 0.0176 -0.0637
patents (LP=5yrs) 0.1994 0.0761 -0.1233
opinions (LP=2yrs) 0.3203 0.0770 -0.2433
opinions (LP=5yrs) 0.3287 0.1036 -0.2251
USSC opinions (LP=2yrs) 0.7600 0.5139 -0.2461
USSC opinions (LP=5yrs) 1.0105 0.6658 -0.3446
Figure 10: Popularity bias. Average number of new citations (infections) received as a function of exposures
when documents are separated into different classes based on the number of citations they receive during
their first two years. The table shows Mutual Information (MI) between exposures and infections, Condi-
tional Mutual Information (CMI) given initial citations and Interaction Information (II) between the three
variables which is the difference between MI and CMI.
As a result of the popularity bias, documents that are already popular will receive more attention. An
alternate explanation is that documents that receive more citations are of higher quality, and preferentially
receive more citations even in the absence of social signals about their current popularity. We do not attempt
to resolve the quality/influence ambiguity in this work, but empirically investigate its presence in our data,
referring to it as the “popularity bias.” Another possible explanation is that some fields are larger than
others, giving documents more potential citations.
Figure 10 shows the average number of new infections documents receive for a given number of exposures
in the three citations domains when these documents are separated into different classes based on the number
of citations they received during a two year latency period. These initial citations provide a signal about
popularity (or quality) which others may later attend. The classes were defined so as to produce equal
statistics bins, whenever possible. They correspond to “low” quality documents (one or two citations during
the two-year latency period), “medium” (3–10 initial citations) and “high” (more than 10 initial citations)
quality documents.
There exists some separation between the classes for all domains. This means that a medium quality
(popularity) document is somewhat more likely to be cited at some exposure level than an low quality
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(unpopular) document. A higher quality (more popular) document is still more likely to be cited at the
same exposure level. Moreover, new citations (infections) saturate sooner for the low quality documents,
and never reach the citing levels of more popular documents. Such saturation could be related to the size
of the community interested in the document. The larger the community, the greater the citation potential
for the document.
The separation between classes is even more pronounced for legal citations than for physics papers. A
high quality legal opinion is about ten times more likely to be cited than a low quality opinion at the same
exposure. In contrast, there is no separation between the classes of patents. The high quality class has fewer
patents in it than other classes, resulting in more noisy signal.
To investigate whether the initial citations account for the correlations between exposures and new
citations (infections), we compute the mutual information between exposures and new citations, conditioned
on initial citations, and compare this value to the mutual information between the variables. Conditional
mutual information (Fig. 10) is significantly less than mutual information in all data sets, which indicates
initial citations could probably be the common cause of exposures and new citations (infections). This lends
evidence to social influence as the source of the bias.
Halo Effect Another type of social influence is possible via the “halo effect”. In cognitive psychology, the halo
effect refers to a cognitive bias in which our impressions of a person color our judgements of that person’s
unrelated character traits, e.g., when physically attractive people are judged to be more trustworthy. In the
scientific citation domain, such a bias could manifest itself when readers attribute more importance, and
pay more attention, to papers that are cited by important scholars. Of course, being cited by a highly cited
paper will raise the visibility of the cited work, naturally increasing citations. Therefore, we control for the
number of exposures of a document and ask whether being cited by few highly cited documents leads to
more citations than being cited by many not-as-popular documents. In other words, is it better to be cited
by one document that receives 100 citations, or by ten documents that receive ten citations each?
To investigate the halo effect, we separate documents into classes based on the number of exposures they
receive during the exposure period. Figure 11 shows the average number of new infections as a function of
the number of initial citations these documents received during the latency period. For the same number of
initial citations, exposures result in a greater number of new citations (infections), as is expected by papers
becoming more visible. If the halo effect held in our data sets, we would see the number of new citations
decrease with the number of initial citations for the same number of exposures. However, we see the opposite:
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(i) papers (LP=2yrs) (ii) patents (LP=2yrs) (iii) opinions (LP=2yrs) (iv) SC opinions (LP=2yrs)
Figure 11: Halo effect. Average number of new citations (infections) documents receive as a function of
the number of initial citations they received during the latency period when documents are separated into
different classes based on the number of exposures they received. For the same level of exposure, the more
initial citations during the latency period, the greater the number of new infections. Latency periods are
two years ((a)–(c)) and five years ((d)–(e)).
for the same number of exposures, having more initial citations leads to more new citations (physics papers
and legal decisions) or a constant number of new citations (patents). Consider physics papers that receive
exactly ten exposures after a two year latency period (Figure 11(a)). When these exposures come from 10
different papers that cite the original paper during the latency period, that paper will receive seven new
citations on average during the infection period. However, if these exposures come from a single paper, the
original paper will only receive fewer than two citations on average. The same is true for different number
of exposures.
The absence of an observed halo effect supports the interpretation of exposures as a measure of visibility,
as opposed to a measure of endorsement by popular documents.
3.4.1 Divided Attention
(i) papers (LP=2yrs) (ii) patents (LP=2yrs) (iii) opinions (LP=2yrs) (iv) SC opinions (LP=2yrs)
Figure 12: Divided attention. The mean number of references in (red) documents citing the original (blue)
document effects the citation rate of the original document. Shown is 2 yr and 5 year latency periods.
Papers making fewer references in their bibliographies are more effective at generating new citations for
their references.
Readers’ limited divided attention could potentially affect a document’s visibility. For example, in FSM,
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data (latency period) MI(EC , I) CMI(EC , I|DC) II(EC, I,DC)
papers (LP=2yrs) 0.4362 0.4191 -0.0172
papers (LP=5yrs) 0.4522 0.4886 0.0363
patents (LP=2yrs) 0.0812 0.0336 -0.0477
patents (LP=5yrs) 0.1994 0.1293 -0.0700
opinions (LP=2yrs) 0.3203 0.1659 -0.1544
opinions (LP=5yrs) 0.3287 0.1946 -0.1341
USSC opinions (LP=2yrs) 0.7600 0.9385 0.1785
USSC opinions (LP=5yrs) 1.0105 1.2073 0.1968
Table 2: Divided attention. We measure Mutual Information (MI) between exposure and infections, Condi-
tional Mutual Information given distractions and the difference between MI and CMI, which is the Interaction
Information (II) between the three variables.
if attention is limited, then a document that appears in a long list of references would be allocated less
attention because of the distractions from other documents in the list of references, hence would be cited
less than a document that appears in a short list of references, simply because readers will not be able to
investigate every relevant reference. To demonstrate the phenomenon of divided attention, we study whether
being cited by a document with a long list of references (more distractions) leads to as many new citations
as being cited by a document with a short list of references (less distractions). Note that we do not know
all the citations that appear in the references section, only citations to other documents; however, averaged
over all documents, this should be proportional to the number of total citations. We frame this hypothesis
as follows.
Divided attention: Being cited by a document with more distractions leads to fewer new citations
than being cited by a document with fewer distractions
(i) papers (LP=2yrs) (ii) patents (LP=2yrs) (iii) cases (LP=2yrs) (iv) SC cases (LP=2yrs)
Figure 13: Breaking down documents into classes with similar quality reveals that divided attention can
play a significant role in limiting citation discovery.
Figure 12 shows the infections vs. exposures plot, with original (blue) documents divided into classes
based on the number of mean distractions. The mean number of distractions is equivalent to the mean number
of references contained in (red) documents citing them minus one (rule out the original blue document itself),
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and the mean number of references is the sum of all references to other documents made by the red documents
divided by the number of red documents. We observed that (1) among physics papers and legal opinions,
more distractions reduce the likelihood the original document is discovered, as the inflections of a document
with low distractions (blue curve) are higher than that with medium distractions (green curve) at the same
exposure level, and the infections of a document with medium distractions are higher than that with high
distractions (red curve). (2) There is not much evidence of divided attention for the domain of patents and
supreme court decisions. This may reflect different conventions within domains: when writing a patent,
authors usually exhaustively search for relevant previous patents to prove novelty of the innovation.
Figure 13 rules out the possibility of biased citation of higher quality (more citable) documents in short
bibliographies. We separate the data points into categories with similar quality which are indicated by
the total number of citations, and plot average infections vs. mean distractions. The results show that
documents with fewer than ten references in their bibliography section are more effective in generating new
citations for their references than documents with more than 30 references, at any level of exposure. These
results are consistent with the phenomenon of divided attention: a cited article “gets lost” in a very long list
of references, and the longer the list, the easier it is to get lost. Moreover, we observed a turning point in the
green curve (low quality documents) that average number of infections increases before this point of mean
distractions and drop after it. This suggests a threshold of attention allocation, and when the distractions
reach this threshold, attention become divided. However, we did not observe a evident turning point in the
blue curve which represents the high quality documents. This may indicate high quality documents would
more likely combat or at least alleviate the attention distractions, and not as vulnerable as low quality
documents.
4 Related Work
Bounded rationality is recognized as an important factor shaping human decisions and behavior [22], in-
cluding consumer behavior [1, 10, 13]. Computer scientists have begun to use attention, a concept related
to bounded rationality, to explain social behavior online [16], including peer production of content in so-
cial media [21, 46]. Eye tracking studies [8, 11] and controlled online experiments [29] demonstrated the
importance of cognitive heuristics and biases in online behavior. Specifically, people pay more attention to
content near the top of the page than to lower content, a cognitive bias known as position bias [35]. Other
studies examined how news articles, Web pages, and YouTube videos, compete for the limited collective
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attention [27, 32, 38, 45].Such studies often reproduced the observed macroscopic phenomena, such as the
extreme inequality of item popularity, but failed to note the link to individual’s cognitive heuristics and
biases.
Bounded rationality affects the complexity of social interactions. Dunbar famously found that brain size,
and resulting cognitive capacity, imposes an upper bound on the number of social contacts [?]. A study of
conversations between Twitter users found that people limit themselves to 150 or so conversation partners [17]
and divide their attention among all incoming messages from their friends [20]. Beyond social media, a study
of email communication within an organization showed that people located in network positions that expose
them to diverse information communicate less with each network neighbor [2].In this paper, we extended
these studies and empirically demonstrate that cognitive scientific citation networks.
The citation patterns of scientific articles is of a particular interest to scientists, who have attempted
to devise methods to use such data to identify high quality articles, important emerging trends, or simply
track one’s own impact. Merton [31] described the phenomenon of “cumulative advantage,” or the “rich
get richer” effect, which he argued brought disproportionately greater recognition to scientists who were
already distinguished. He explored the possible psychosocial mechanisms of this phenomenon, but as he
limited his studies to Nobel laureates, it is not clear whether these principles applied to other scientists.
While Merton did not specifically mention attention, others have argued [15, 25] that attention plays a role
in the growing inequality of citations scientists receive for their work. Until now, few studies have explicitly
addressed the strategies scientists use to allocate attention. Instead, researchers studied what features of an
article lead to increased citation counts. Such features include the number of authors [47], coverage by the
popular press [36], prestige of the first author [31], and journal’s impact factor [26]. For example, studies
of papers posted to arXiv repository demonstrated a long-term citation boost for papers appearing in the
top position of arXiv daily announcements [12, 18]. None of these studies have specifically accounted for
divided attention, which prevents unbiased discovery of available literature. This could create inefficiencies
in science, with researchers overlooking some high quality papers or unwittingly duplicating the work of
others.
5 Conclusion
We described an empirical approach to disentangling factors contributing to the strategies people use to
discover knowledge in three different domains: scientific papers, patents, and legal opinions. The key to
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our approach is to split the data into more homogeneous populations and to carry out ‘human response
dynamics’-based analysis within each population [20]. Our study identified common patterns in citing
behavior. We found that people pay more attention to content that is easier to find: this leads to the
visibility bias. This bias may result in some documents receiving more citations than less visible documents
of higher quality. We also found that attention paid to content decays over time: novelty bias leads people
to pay more attention to recent information. In addition we demonstrated that popularity bias exists: other
factors being equal, people prioritize information that received more attention from peers, as measured by
the number of citations. On the other hand, we found no evidence for another type of social influence: being
cited by a popular document does not attract preferentially more attention to the cited document. This
is contrary to the halo effect identified by psychologists, in which a person’s ability in one area colors the
perceptions of others of his abilities in other areas. While our study does not replace controlled experiments,
our analysis of existing behavioral data can guide future experiments to explore the causal relationships
proposed here.
These findings suggest that bounded rationality affects knowledge discovery. Rather than evaluate all
available documents in order to find the best ones to cite, people rely on simple cognitive heuristics in their
citing decisions, for example, whether they saw the document or how new it is. As the size and complexity
of our knowledge continues to grow, the risk introduced by bounded rationality is that high quality relevant
knowledge will be missed, thus slowing the pace of innovation. Computational techniques that automatically
analyze knowledge contained in citations networks may mitigate this “burden of knowledge” [?]. However,
the design of such techniques must take bounded rationality into account, or risk exacerbating its effects.
For example, ranking content by popularity steers attention to popular content, which may be of lower
quality [29]. Building systems that help us overcome our bounded rationality should be our priority: our
capacity for rapid innovation depends on our ability to quickly discover relevant knowledge in information
networks.
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